Research

Affective polarization research has established that partisans increasingly dislike one another, but less attention has been paid to the dimensions through which such animosity is structured. This study argues that national identity can function as a distinct moral domain that intensifies, rather than mitigates, partisan polarization. Using original survey data collected in South Korea in the aftermath of the December 2024 martial law declaration, we examine how citizens evaluate partisan groups in moral terms rooted in national identity. We find that partisans systematically judge outgroup supporters as less patriotic than their co-partisans. This moral boundary sharpens as national identification becomes more central to individuals' self-concept. This effect is strongest when outgroup partisanship is defined by direct party rivalry and among conservative partisans. These findings suggest that national identity may underpin partisan exclusion, offering a more nuanced account of the conventional view that it primarily promotes social cohesion.

Researchers have begun to investigate the effectiveness of a wide range of diplomatic tools used by international and domestic actors in promoting human rights. As one of the most visible diplomatic figures in world politics, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) often champions human rights, yet if and how much such efforts make a difference has received little systematic attention. Using new data on official UNSG visits between 1997 and 2018, we examine whether and how UN diplomacy improves human rights in the countries visited. We argue that UNSG visits can enhance human rights conditions through two related mechanisms. First, they attract concentrated media and advocacy attention, creating focal points around which human rights organizations can mobilize. Second, by meeting with and publicly recognizing domestic civil society organizations, the UNSG enhances their legitimacy and visibility, strengthening their capacity to maintain advocacy efforts and increase pressure on governments. Our empirical analysis lends strong support to this argument. Countries receiving a UNSG visit show significant subsequent improvements in human rights performance, even after accounting for potential endogeneity. Results hold with various model specifications and alternative human rights indicators. Taken together, the findings demonstrate that UNSG visits are a distinct and effective form of UN engagement that can lead to measurable improvements in human rights protection, even without coercive authority.

The rise of China as a global power has been a prominent feature in international politics. Simultaneously, the United States has been engaged in ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia for the past two decades, requiring a significant commitment of resources, focus, and determination. This paper investigates how third-party countries react to the United States’ preoccupation with these conflicts, particularly in terms of diplomatic co-operation and alignment. We introduce a measure of US distraction and utilize network-based indicators to assess diplomatic co-operation or alignment. Our study tests the hypothesis that when the US is distracted, other states are more likely to co-operate with its principal rival, China. Our findings support this hypothesis, revealing that increased co-operation with China is more probable during periods of US distraction. However, a closer examination of state responses shows that democracies distance themselves from China under these circumstances, while non-democracies move closer.

Who supports Russia in the Russo-Ukrainian war? We provide a systematic empirical analysis of the United Nations General Assembly resolution to suspend Russian membership at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to identify the underlying reasons why some United Nations (UN) members support Russia. Our analysis provides empirical evidence supporting the hypotheses derived from existing studies. We demonstrate that democratic countries are more likely to vote for the resolution to suspend the Russian membership in the HRC, and non-democratic ones are more likely to vote against it, with abstention as the baseline for comparison. Additionally, we find that economic and political ties, measured through trade dependency, Russian humanitarian aid, and arms trade, factor in when policymakers decide on their positions at the UN. Lastly, contrary to the grievance hypothesis, which supposes that countries dissatisfied with the current international order support revisionist Russia, we find that the countries sanctioned by the United States in the past are more likely to support the resolution suspending the Russian membership at the HRC.